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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGJ;ABILITY OF TORT JUDGM£NT.-Plaintiff recovered 
judgment against X for damages caused by X's negligent operation of his 
automobile. Afterwards X obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. Held, that 
the judgment was thereby discharged. Jefferson Transfer Co. v. Hull, (Wis. 
1918)' 166 N. w. 1. . 
§ 17a of the BANKRUPTCY ACT recites that "a discharge in bankruptcy 
shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as * * * 
(2) are liabilities for * * * willful and malicious injuries to the person or 
property of another * * *" § 63a (1) includes among provable debts "a 
fi.-.,;:ed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, abso-
lutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition." The remaining clauses 
·of § 63a refer to costs and provable debts reduced to judgments after the 
filing of the petition and to debts which are "(4) founded upon ah open ac-
count, or upon a contract express or implied." Reading the two sections to-
gether, as we must, it seems that the statute prescribes a double require-
ment for the discharge of a specific liability: first, it must be "provable"; 
second, it must be outside the exceptions enumerated in § 17a. Friend v. 
Talcott, 228 U. S. 27. The enumeration of certain non-dischargeable tort 
liabilities presupposes ·that some other tort liabilities may be discharged. 
In re New York Tmmel Co., 159 Fed. 688. This squares with the older 
cases hoiding that liquidation of a tort claim by judgment makes the claim 
provable. Comstock v. Grout, 17 Vt. 512; In re Comstock, 22 Vt. 642; 
Ellis v. Ham, 28 Me. 385; Crouph v. Gridley, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 250; Kellogg v. 
Schuyler, 2 Denio (N. Y. 73; Blake v. Bigelow, 5 Ga. 437; Howland v. Car-
son, 16 N. B. R. 372. Whatever the reason, all the cases agree with the 
principal case in allowing the discharge of a. tort judgment unless the lia-
bility falls within the exceptions of § 17a; In re Lorde, 144 Fed. 320; U. S. 
ex rel. Kelley v. Peters, 166 Fed. 613, 177 Fed. 885, 217 U. S. 6o6; In re 
Walrath, 175 Fed. 243; In re Wakefield, 207 Fed. 18o; In re Berlin &c. Co., 
225 Fed. 683, affirmed sub. nom. Moore v. Doieglas, 230 Fed. 399; McClellan 
v. Schmidt, 235 Fed. 986; Joh11ston v. Bneckheimer, 133 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
{i49; Thompkins v. Williams, 137 App. Div. (N. Y.) 521, 2o6 N. Y. 744; In 
re Grout, 88 Ver. 318; Br.ACK, BANKR. § 741; BRANDENBURG, BANKR. § 156o.; 
Cor.r.IER, BANKR. (nth), 436; Rr:MINGTON, BANKR., § 68o. The opposing. 
view would make no distinction in this regard between liquidated and un-
liquidated tort liabilities. LoVELAND, BAN'.KR. § 2g6, 2o~ASE AND CoMM£NT 
591. Decisive cases hold unliquidated tort claims non-P"rovable, and their 
reasoning would generally include tort judgments as well. Brown v. United 
B11tton Co., 149 Fed. 48; 7 Cor.. L. Rr:v. 36o; 20 HARV. L. REV. 646; 9 MICH. 
L. Rr:v. 499; Eberlein v. Fidelity & Dcp. Co., 164 Wis. 242. § 63 has been 
considered as referring only to contractual or quasi-contractual claims. 
Moreover, the rendition of a judgment does not generally ~ge the nature 
-0£ the obligation.. Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457; 15 Cor.. L. Rr:v. 543; 
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Woehrle v. Canclini, 158 Cat 107. As the latest expression of the legisla-
ture, § 63 would ordinarily control if it clearly excludes tort judgments from 
being proved. U.S. v. Jackson, 143 Fed. 783. 
BU.LS AND NOT.ES-BONA FIDF. HOLD:ER-INT£RDEP.ENDENT AGREF.MENTS.-
Plaintiff gave his notes to a land company under a contract that in consid-
eration of the payment of the notes, the payee should convey certain land 
and on the date of the last payment, plaintiff should have a warranty deed. 
The payee indorsed the notes to the defendant before maturity for value. 
Defendant also took an assignment of the land contract for security. On 
the maturity of the first note, plaintiff tendered payment asking for a con-
~eyance. As the land company had become insolvent and had never owned 
the land, a conveyance could not be made; thereupon plaintiff deposited the 
money in defendant bank upon an agreement that plaintiff might withdraw 
it when he saw fit. When plaintiff sought to withdraw it, defendant claimed 
the amount of the notes. Held, that the plaintiff was not liable on the notes. 
Todd v. State Bank of Edgewood, (Ia. 1917), 165 N. W. 593. 
The case seems on its face to be well within the doctrine of McNight 
v. Parsons, 136 Ia. 390, to the effect that knowledge by the purchaser of a 
negotiable instrument that it was given in consideration of an executory 
contract will not affect his rights as a bona fide holder unless he alsq had 
notice of a breach of such contract. Russ Lumber &c. Co. v. Land &c. Co., 
120 Cat. 521; Bank of Sampson v. Hatcher, 151 N. C. 359; U.S. Nat. Bank 
v. Floss, 38 Ore. 68. But the court in the principal case applies the rule that 
the purchaser who knows that the performance of an executory agreement 
is a condition precedent to the right of the payee to demand or recover pay-
ment is in no better position than the payee. Thomas v. Page, Fed. Cas. No. 
13go6; Sutton v. Beckwith, 68 Mich. 303. This modifies the McKnight case, 
supra, for that pays no attention to the Jcind of executory contract the pur-
chaser might know of. Though the distinction between notice of an exec-
utory contract and notice of the existence of mutually dependent agreements 
had been pointed out, the cases ignored it. Jennings v. Todd, II8 Mo. 2¢; 
7 HARv. L. Rr:v. 431. Even the Sutton case, supra, the opinion of which sup-
ports the instant case, may be distinguished on the facts because the pur-
chaser was there charged with knowledge of the actual fraud of the payee. 
BROKERS-AUTHORITY m WRITmG-SuFF1cn::NcY IN Dr:sCRIPTloN OF LAND. 
-Defendant in writing authorized plaintiff to sell property describing it as 
"my stock ranch located in sections 9, 17, and 21, Township 3 South, Range 
13 East, Sweetgrass· County, Mont." Plaintiff sued for commissions earned 
under the contract. Held, contract unenforcible for want of sufficient des-
cription, the Code requiring agreements authorizing brokers to sell real 
estate to be in writing and signed by party to be charged therewith. Rogers v. 
Lippy ct u.i-., (Wash., 1918), 16g Pac. 858. 
The majority opinion finds its support in the case of Thompson v. Eng-
lish, 76 Wash 23. It was suggested in the principal case that if the problem 
were a new one in the state, a different conclusion might be reached from that 
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reached in Thompson v. English and the decisions following the law there 
announced. In assuming that it was necessary to add something" to the des-
cription contained in the contract, in order to make it complete, the case 
seems to proceed on a wrong conception of the question involved. Parol 
evidence may be resorted to for purpose of identifying the description con-
tained in the writing with its location upon the ground, but not for the 
purpose of ascertaining and locating the land about which the parties nego-
tiated and supplying a description thereof which they omitted from the writ-
ing. Thompson v. English (supra). In Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328, a des-
cription of the property in an option contract as our farm in Le Claires 
Reserve, Rock Island County, was held sufficient within the rule that "that is 
certain which can be made certain from the words employed." The descrip-
tion in Guyer v. Warren (mpra) is no more definite on its face than the de-
scription in the principal case, the rule laid down in the one is the same in 
substance as the rule laid down in the other, and yet an entirely opposite 
conclusion was reached as to the effect of the writing. Such a difference can 
be explained only on the theory that the maxim "that is certain which can be 
made more certain" is not applicable to cases of this character. The doctrine 
of the principal case is followed only in Washington. The rule of Guyer v. 
Warren (supra) finds support in many states. See Sanchez v. Yorba, 8 
Cal. App. 490; Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545; Hodges v. Kowing, 58 Conn. 
12; Mead v. Parker, II5 Mass. 413; Robeson v. Hornbaker, 3 N. J. Eq. 6o. 
CARRitRS OF PASSENGERS-C~A'tlON OF THE Rn.ATION.-Plaintiff's husband 
being sick, she desired to go to a nearby town where she could arrange to 
send him to a hospital. The fast train of the defendant did not ordinarily 
stop. The ticket agent wired the facts to the division superintendent who 
gave orders for the train to stop, but it failed to do so. In an action for 
damages, held, that the relation of passenger and carrier has been created, 
Fenton et u~. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (Wash. 1918), l6g Pac. 863. 
Defendant claimed that it owed no public duty to stop its train and that 
its promise to do so was a mere gratuity which did not create the relation of 
passenger and carrier. The court held that on whatever terms the common 
carrier receives and carries a person the relation of carrier and passenger 
exists, citing Walther v. Southern Przc. Co. 150 Cal. 76g. The essentials of 
the relation are an offer by the person to become a passenger and the accept-
ance of such person, either expressly or impliedly, as a passenger, Illinois 
Cent. Ry. Co. v. O'Keefe, 168 Ill. II5; W.ebster v. Fitchburg Ry. Co., 161 Mass. 
2g8 ;GonnAlUl, BAn.MEN'tS AND CARRIERS, 145; HUTCHINSON ON CARRIERS, (3rd 
Ed.), n48. A commop. carrier of passengers is bound to accept all persons 
who properly present themselves, but may accept persons as passengers 
when it is not bound to do so, and when it does so accept them the 
relation is established, Peason v. Duane, 4 Wall (U. S.) 6o5 ;Hannibal 
&c Ry. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall (U. S.) 262. So where the carrier ran a stage 
coach to the depot, one taking passage thereon to the depot was a passenger 
though he had not as yet bought a ticket. Buffett v. Troy & B. Ry. Co., 40 
N. Y. 168. Passive acquiescence in allowing persons to get on at unusual 
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and. dangerous places does not make one standing in such place a passenger, 
Youngerman v. New York, N. H. & H. RY. Co., 223 Mass. 29. But one who 
gets on a train ~t 2n unusual place will be deemed a passenger after safely en-
tering the car, Dewire v. Boston & M. Ry., 148 l\fass 343. It is not within the 
authority of all agents to accept as passengers persons who present them-
selves. The permission of the engineer will not make one a passenger, Grim-
shaw v. Lake Shore & kl. S. Ry., 205 N. Y. 371, nor of the baggage man, 
Reary v. Louisville, N. 0. & T. Ry., 40 La. Ann. 32, nor of the brakeman, 
Ca11diff v. Lonisville, N. 0. & T. R)•., 42 La. Ann. 477. A yardmaster, not 
acting in the course of employment, cannot accept persons as passengers, Chi. 
~t. P. &c. R3•. v. Br_vant, 65 Fed. ¢9. In the absence of a rule of practice to 
the contrary the freight conductor is not entitled to accept persons for car-
riage, A. T. & S. F. R~>'· v. Johnson, 3 Oki. 41; Bergan v. Cent. Ver. Ry. Co., 
82 Conn. 574; Neice \'. Chi. & A. R. R. Co., 254 Ill. 595. But if an emer-
gency arises, he may do so, Va11dalia R. Co. v. Darby, 60 Ind. App. 294 It is 
within the apparent authority of passenger conductors to accept persons as 
passengers, Fit:;gibbon v. Clzi. (:r N. W. RJ•. Co., 108 Ia. 614; Mo. K. & T. Ry. 
v. Pope, (Tex. Civ. App., 1912), 149 S. W. n85. The ticket agent has author-
ity to make a contract for carriage, Kan. Pac. Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; 
Ho11ston. E. & W. T. R3•. Co. v. Jackson, (Tex. Civ. App., Igor), 61 S. W. 
440. Where the president of one road was riding in the engine on the invita-
tion of the president of the defendant road, the relation was created, The 
Phil. & R .R3•. Co. v. Dcrb30, 14 Howard 468. The instant case holds that the 
division superintendent may create the relation of passenger and carrier by 
special contract. 
CHARITIES-PURPOSES OF GIF't-ERECTlON OF MEMORIAL.-A testator be-
queathed his residuary estate to his executor to be devoted to the construction 
of an ornamental arch or gate with some suitable or simple inscription there-
on, as a memorial to his wife and himself, at some suitable part of Civic 
Center, a park of Denver, Col., designed for public convenience and to pro-
mote civic beauty and civic pride. Held, that the will created a valid chari-
table trust. Haggin v. Inter11ational Trust Co. (Col. 1917), 169 Pac. 138. 
According to the general rule, the existence of a ~efinite beneficiary, 
capable of enforcing its execution, is indispensable to the creation of a valid 
trust. Morice v. Bishop of Durham, IO Ves. 521; Ad)'e v. Smitli, 44 Conn. 60; 
Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 2II; Little v. Willford, 31 Minn. 173; Holland v. 
Alcock, 1o8 N. Y. 312; Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 356. To this general rule 
there are at least two well defined exceptions,-charities and monuments. See 
5 HARV. L. Rsv. 389 and 15 HARV. L. "Rsv. 509. It may be assumed that the 
trust in the instant case would have been good as a charity, if it had pro-
vided merely for the erection of an ornamental arch or monument in a public 
park. The question then is whether the trust is any less a charity because 
of the provision in the will for the inscription of the names of the testator and 
his wife as the donors. To hold that such provision prevented the trust from 
being a charity would mean that the motives of the testator should be deter-
minative of whether or not a charity were created, for certainly the monu-
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ment is not rendered less beautiful or less ornate by the inscription. Such 
would afford no sound or satisfactory basis for the law of charitable trusts; 
it would also deprive the public of the benefits of many trusts simply because 
of some selfish motive on the part of the testator. Indubitably, the purpose 
and objects of a gift in a will, and not the motives of the testator, will deter-
mine whether or not it is charitable. Smith v. Walker, 181 Pa. 109; In re 
Graves, 242 Ill. 23; Morristown Trust Co. v. Morristown, 82 N. J. Eq. 521, 
(contra). But if it were held that such a trust, as the one in the instant case, 
is not a charity, the question arises whether it comes within the second ex-
ception, that of monuments, and is hence valid. It seems as if the reason why 
it is held not a charity is an argument per se that is is a monument. The large 
number of cases, that have held trusts for the erection of a monument valid, 
has provided for· monuments at the graves of the testators. Adnam v. Cole, 
6 Beav. 353; Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N. J. Eq. 347 ;Re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 
239; Bainbridge's App., 97 Pa. 482; Fite v. Beasley, So Tenn. 328; Emans v. 
Hickman, 12 "Hun. 425. Though it is clear that the instant case does not 
come within the facts of the majority of cases relative to monuments, yet it 
seems just as clear that it does come within the principle enunciated by those 
cases. The one monument appears to be as much a part of the funeral ex-
penses as the other, and as much a tribute to the deceased to whose memory 
it was erected. It was so held in Trimmer v. Danby, 24 L. J. Rep. Ch. 424 
(~6), where the will provided for the erection of a monument to the tes-
tator's memory in St. Paul's Cathedral. A number of cases have held that 
it is not necessary that the monument be erected to the testator's memory. 
Masters v. Masters, l P. Wms. 423; Mussett v. Bingle, W. N. (1876) 170; 
Wood v. Vandenburgh, 6 Paige 277. 
COMPROMISE AND SE't'!'LEMEN'l'-WHA'l' CoNS'l'ITU'l'ES.-Defendants admitted 
liability for the amount of two shipments of shoes, but denied a claim arising 
out of a third shipment, having countermanded their order before delivery. 
Upon the receipt of a statement from plaintiff which included the three items, 
defendants mailed him a check for the precise amo.unt due on the two ad-
mitted claims, stating at the same time that the check was in full of account. 
Plaintiff accepted and caslied the check, and later brought this action for the 
amount due on the third shipment. Defendants pleaded an accord and satis-
faction. Held, that as to the third item, the acceptance of the check did not 
amount to a compromise and settlement, and that plaintiff could only recover 
damages for the breach of the contract. Krohn-Fechheimer Co. v. Palmer, 
(Mo., 1917), 199 l'· W. 763. 
The rule that acceptance of a less sum than is actually due will not operate 
to extinguish the whole debt, although agreed by the creditor to be received 
on such condition, is well established by the great weight of authority. 
BISHOP, CON'l'RAC'l'S, §so. Logically it is difficult to perceive any sound dis-
tinction between the above case and payment of an amount concededly due 
on a claim, the remainder of which is disputed. Accordingly some courts have 
held that in the latter event there is no binding compromise, there being no 
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consideration to support the agreement. Driscoll v. Sullivan, (Ind., 1917), 
115 N. E. 331; Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co., 103 Minn. 150; Frank et al. v. 
Vogt, 166 N. Y. Supp. 175; Weidner v. Standard Life & Accident /11surance 
Co., 130 Wis. IO; Whittaker Chain Tread Co. v. Standard Auto Supply Co., 
216 Mass. 204- Other courts, treating the whole claim as unliquidated, have 
shown a tendency to sustain agreements in discharge of liability when· any 
part of the claim is in dispute, and although payment is only of the smaller 
amount which was conceded by the debtor to be due. Tanner v. Merrill, I08 
Mich. 58; Neely v. Thompson, 68 Kan. 193; Treat v. Price, 47 Neb. 875; 
C. M. & St. P. Ry Co. v. Clark, 178 U. S. 353. These later courts, consider-
ing the rule that payment of a less amount than is actually due will not dis-
charge the whole debt as a rule technical in its conception and harsh in its 
operation, have evidently taken this opportunity to limit its application • 
. CoNsTrTuTIONAL LAw-Dus PRocr:ss oF LAW-CARRIAGE oF STATS OFFI-
CIALS BY R.AtLROADS.-A state reserved the right to amend alter or repeal 
the charter of a railroad company. Held,-It canot by virtue of such right 
impose on the railroad company the burden of carrying free of charge state 
officials, for that works a deprivation without due proces of law of the com-
pany's right to charge such officials fare. Napier v. Delware, L. & TV. R. Co., 
(N. Y. 1917), 102 At!. 444 
The decision proceded upon an assumption that the railroad company had 
a right to charge state officials even though the state should so amend the 
company's charter as to give it no such authority. By this assumption the 
question of the extent of the state's reserved power of amendment is elimi-
nated. The case ·therefore assumes that the privilege of charging all per-
sons was a vested right and its taking away not an act within the police 
power. In Dunbar v. Boston & P. R. Corp., 181., Mass. 383, it was held that 
where the damage done is small and the public advantage great an interference 
with a vested right would be sustained. This is contrary, however, to the 
generally accepted view. That such a taking was not an exercise of the re-
served pow~r of the legislature but constituted a taking of property without 
due process of law was held in Delaware, Lackawanna and Western R. R. Co. 
v. Board of Public Utilities Commisio11ers, 85 N. J. L. 28. The same con-
clusion was reached in Pa. R. R. Co. v. Herrmann, 8g N. J. L. 582. The 
charter however in the last case did not reserve the right to alter, amend or 
repeal the same. The legislative act requiring a railroad to run four trains 
per day was held confiscatory and unconstitutional as depriving the company 
of property without due proces of law. TiVashington, Potomac & Chesa-
. peake Ry. Co. v. Magruder, 198 Fed. 218. Laws requiring railroad companies 
to construct and maintain spur tracks to industrial plants work a deprivation 
of property without due proces of law. Mcfonis v. New Orleans & N. ER. 
Co., 109 l\fiss. 482. A state statute requiring in interstate as well as intrastate 
commerce separate Pullman accommodations for the white and colored races 
though entailing great expense in view of the almost negligible number of 
colored Pullman passenger is not a taking of property without du!! process of 
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law. Southern Ry. Co. v. Norton, II2 Miss. 302. An order of a state rail-
road commission requiring truckage connection between competing railroads 
for interchange of business is not due process of law, if the order is arbitrary 
or unreasonable and not justified by public necessity. State of Washington v. 
Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510 .• 
CoNSTITUTIONAr, LAW-TAXATION oF Foruo;IGN CoRPoRATIONS-PRIVD'.."JWS oF 
DOING Doi.u:sTic BusINi;:ss.-Under a statute requiring every foreign cor-
poration doing business within the state to pay an annual excise tax of one 
one-hundredth of one per cent of the par value of its authorized capital 
stock, plaintiff had paid $5,500. In an action to recover the money so paid, 
held, the statute under which the tax was levied was unconstitutional, as 
burdening interstate commerce, and laid upon property of the corporation 
beyond the state, hence plaintiff should recover. International Paper Co. v. 
Massachusetts, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Ops., March 4, .1918. 
In this decision the Supreme Court reverses the supreme court of Mass-
achusetts, 228 Mass. IOI, n7 N. E. 246. The decision in the latter court is 
noted in I6 MICH. L. IU:v. I27. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U. S. I78, 38 Sup. 
Ct. 85, decided Dec. IO, I9I7, was fo11owed. The Looney Case was noted 
in I6 MICH. L. Ro:v. 264 The contro11ing fact in the principal case was the 
lack of any maximum limit. In Kansas City, etc. Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 
227, 233, Mr. Justice Hughes had said: "We have recently had occasion 
(Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, supra), to emphasize the necessary 
caution that every case involving the validity of a tax must be decided upon 
its own facts ; and if the tax purports to be laid upon a subject within the 
taxing power of the State, it is not to be condemned by the application of 
any artificial rule but only where the conclusion is required that its necessary 
operation and effect is to make it a prohibited exaction." Without any con-
sideration, however, as to whether the amount of the tax was such as to 
constitute a burden upon plaintiff's interstate business the court. in the prin-
cipal case held the statute unconstitutional, on the ground that there was 
no maximum fixed. Those who have been inclined to a feeling of dizziness 
in following the rulings of the Supreme Court on this subject can gain some 
comfort from Mr. Justice Vandevanter's opinion when he says: "In dispos-
ing of these questions there has been at times some diversity of° opinion 
among the members of the court and some of the decisions have not been 
in full accord with others." 
CoNSTlTUTIONAJ, LAW-TRADING STAMP STATUTts.-The complainant com-
panies sought to restrain the defendants from enforcing the provisions of 
the statute prohibiting the exercise of the trading stamp and coupon busi-
ness in that state, on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Held, 
constitutional. Sperry & H11tchinson Co. v. Wiegle, (Wis. I9I8), I66 N. 
W.54 
The case settles the law of Wisconsin in accord with the present trend 
of the authorities. The authorities are collected in I6 MICH. L. IU:v. 263. 
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CoRPCRAT10Ns-"PRAcT1cING LAw"-WHAT CoxsT1TUTits.-The defendant 
trust company advertised that making a will without legal advice was haz-
ardous, and offered its services; and, when consulted, provided an attorney, 
employed by its own attorneys. Held, that defendant had violated Pi>NAL 
LAW (CONSOL. LAWS, c. 40) sec. 280, making it unlawful for a corporation 
to render or furnish legal advice, to furnish attorneys or counsel in any 
other manner, to assume to be entitled to practice law, or to furnish legal 
advice, or to a'dvertise that either alone or together with, or by, or through 
any person, whether duly and regularly admitted attorney at law or not, 
it has, owns, conducts, or maintains a law office, or an office for the practice 
qf law, or for furnishing legal advice, services, or counsel. People v. Peo-
ple's Trust Co., 167 N. Y. S. 767. 
The practice of law by a corporation is both malmn fa se and ma/um 
prohibitum, according to the law of the state of New York. That a corpor-
ation can neither practice law, nor hire lawyers to carry on the business 
of practicing law for it; and that, for a corporation to do so, is malum in se, 
and contrary to public policy, was the holding of the court in llJatter of Co-
operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. S. 479. Section 28o of the PtNAL LAW of New 
York, above referred to, declares that any corporation which practices law 
or hires lawyers to. carry on. the business of practicing law, shall be liable 
to a fine. Just what constitutes "practicing law" by a corporation has been 
the subject of litigation in the New York courts several times previous to 
the instant case. A realty corporation retained and employed by a lessee of 
premises to furnish "legal and other expert services" in a proceeding con-
nected with the condemnation of the lessee's interests to a public use, under 
an agreement that it was to be paid 33% per cent of the award, was held to 
be practicing law, in In Re Certain Lands in City of New York, 128 N. Y. S. 
999. A corporation which contracted with third persons to prosecute legal 
proceedings on their behalf, and retained an attorney to conduct the litiga-
tions, paying him money for incidental expenses, was held to be practicing 
law, in U.S. Title Guaranty Co. v. Browii, 149 N. Y. S. 186; affirmed in 152 
N. Y. S., 470; affirmed in 217 N. Y. 628. A Delaware corporation whicli 
maintained an office in New York City, and distributed circulars to attor-
neys at law, offering either to incorporate companies under the laws of Del-
aware or to furnish all the necessary forms, etc., for the attorneys to do so 
themselves; and which, through certain New York attorneys, who acted as 
forwarders to the home office in Delaware, actually incorporated three com-
panies, was held to be practicing law, in bi Re Pace et al., 156 N. Y. S. 641. 
Where a corporation, formed to secure reductions of assessments, employed 
and retained an attorney to conduct proceedings to obtain the "reduction of 
a third party's assessment, and the attorney sued out a writ of certiorari 
to review the action of the tax board in refusing a reduction of assessment, 
such corporation was held to be practicing law, People v. Purdy et al, 162 
N. Y. S. 56 and 16z N. Y. S. 70. In the instant case, the court held that the 
practice of law was not confined to performing services in an action or 
proceeding pending in courts of justice, but includes the drafting and super-
vising of wills ; and, consequently, that the defendant had violated the statute. 
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CoVJ>NAN'ts-Bun.nING Rts'tRIC'tIONS - R.IGH't 'to Br;NtFI't. - Complainant 
and defendant were owners of adjoining lots platted and sold with restric-
tions in the deed of each grantee. The restrictions were to the effect that 
dwellings built on .lots should have at least six rooms and be placed twenty-
four feet from the street line. Defendant, who took without notice that the 
restrictions were imposed for the benefit of other lots, built a combined bus-
iness and dwelling block up to the sidewalk. In an action to enforce ob-
servance of the restrictions, held, complainant not entitled to the benefit of 
the restrictions, and defendant's building did not amount to a violation 
thereof. Kiley v. Hall, (Ohio, 1917), II7 N. E. 359. 
In an action to enforce building restrictions, it is important to show, 
not only that the defendant is bound thereby, but also that the plaintiff is 
entitled to sue. Whether the restrictions are for the benefit q,f the vendor, 
or are meant by him and understood by the purchasers to be for the common 
advantage of them, is a question of fact, Jar.LY, Rts'tRIC't!VS CoVENANl'S AF-
l!SCTING I.,AND, p. 57. Knowledge of the effect of the restrictions ·may be 
important in deciding whether one party is bound and the other has the 
right to sue, Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. Div. 125; II Ch. Div. 866. The 
knowledge or notice to the parties may be actual and found in the imme-
diate deed in express terms of mutuality, Henderson v. Champion .• 83 N. J. 
Eq. 554. If it settled that the restriction was for the benefit of a particular 
piece of land, then, although there is no mention of the restriction in the 
immediate deed, the right to assert such benefit may pass by a conveyance of 
the land and "appurtenances", Hartt v. Rueter, 223 Mass: 207. The same 
result should be reached without the word "appurtenances". The intention 
of the vendor that the restrictions were for the benefit of the several grantees 
may be inferred from statements made at a public auction~ Nottingham Pat-
ent Brick & Tile Co. v. Butler, 16 Q. B. D. 778, Jar.LY, Rts'tRIC'tIVS Covr:-
NAN'tS AFFSC'tING LAND, p. 57. The most common method of imposing build-
ing restrictions upon the land for the benefit of subsequent purchasers is by 
a general building scheme, Wiegman v. Kusel, 270 Ill. 520. The proof of the 
general plan must, however, be clear. Contiguous lots conveyed with vari-
ous restrictions and some without restrictions may defeat proof of. a gen-
eral plan. St. Patrick's Religious &c. Ass'n. v. Hale, (Mass. 1917), n6 N. 
E. 407. It must be clear either from the language of the deeds or from cir-
cumstances that there is a general plan, Dana v. Wentworth, III Mass. 291. 
If the general plan becomes abortive, it is a circumstance tending to show 
that the restriction was not intended for the benefit of the other lots, Cough-
lin v. Barker, 46 Mo. App. 54, 66. If the restrictions on the platted land are 
in the chain of titJe of both complainant and defendant, complainant is en-
titled to enforce the restrictions, Hartwig et al.· v. Grace Hospital, (Mich. 
1917), 165 N. W. 827. The better view, however, is the contrary one. See 
14 MICH. L. ruv. 685. 
Dr;n1cA'tioN-Acc:ttP'tANcr;-\V:e:A'.l' CoNS'tI'tU'tSS.-P sued under a Street 
Closing Act to recover compensation for the closing of a street which he 
claimed had been dedicated to the public, an acceptance of said street being 
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implied from a general public user for ten years and the construction there-
on by various public officials of gas mains, sewers, street lamps, signposts, 
and an ash sidewalk. Held, that these things were insufficient to show its 
acceptance as a public street by the city. In re Wallace, Barnes, and Mat-
thews Aves., (N. Y., I9I7), n8 N. E. 5o6. 
In order to create a valid common law dedication all the authorities agree 
that there must be, first, an intention to dedicate and, second, an acceptance 
by the public.' See ELLIDn, RoADs AND STREeTS, Secs. I24, 150; ANGSLL, 
HIGHWAYS, Secs. 142, 157; TIFFANY, Rr:AL PROPERTY, Secs. 422, 423. As-
suming the sufficiency of the intenti~ to dedicate, the question arises as 
t9 what shall constitute a valid acceptance. Most courts would hold that the 
nature of the requisite acceptance is dependent on whether it is the dedicator 
or the municipality that is sought to be charged. Thus, in order to bind 
the grantor it is sufficient in most jurisdictions if there has been a substan-
t.ial public user for the purposes of the dedication. Cassidy v. Sullivan, 75 
Neb. 847; Atty. Gen. v. Abbott, r54 Mass. 323; Downend v. Kansas City, 
156 Mo. 6o; Alden Coal Co. v. Challis, 200 Ill. 222; Green v. Elliott, 86 Ind. 
53; Reg. v. Petrie, 30 Eng. Law and Eq. 207; Carter v. City of Portland, 
4 Ore. 339; Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss. 423; Crump v. Minis, 64 N. C. 
767; TIFFANY, R:r,:AL PROPERTY, p. 978. But in some jurisdictions it seems 
that user alone will not even bind him. Speir v. Town of New Utrecht, 121 
N. Y. 420; White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 254. In Terry v. McClung, w4 Va. 599, 
it was held that a road dedicated to the public must be accepted by the 
county court on its records before it can he a public road; in some states 
it is held that the acceptance must be by the city council. Schuster v. Barber 
Asphalt Paving Co., 24 Ky. Rep. 2346; Brewer v. Pine Bluff, 8o Ark. 48g. 
According to what seems to represent the weight of authority, user alone 
does not constitute an adequate acceptance when the municipality is the 
party sought to be charged. Downing v. Coatesville Borough, 214 Pa. 29I; 
Downend v. Kansas City, supra; Smith v. Smythe, 197 N. Y. 457. But, to 
the effect that user alone will constitute such an acceptance as will bind the 
municipality see ELLIDn, RoADS AND ST~s, p. 163; King v. Leake, 5 B. & 
Ad. 469, (1833), but this was changed by the HIGHWAY Ac:r of 1835; Green 
v. Town of Ca11aan, 29 Conn. 157; Hobbs v. Inhabitants of Lowell, 19 Pick. 
405; Town of Fowler v. Linquist, 138 Ind. 566, (semble); City of Hammond 
v. Maher, 30 Ind. App. 286. In the last case the court said : "The evidence 
does not show that the appellant had formally accepted it, or that it had 
ever caused it to be worked as a street, but under the authorities this is not 
necessary". But even in most of the jurisdictions that deem user alone in-
sufficient to show an acceptance on the part of the public so as to bind the 
city, it would be held that an acceptance by the public need not be by a 
formal act of the public authorities, but may be implied from the latter's 
improving or repairing the same, or from any other act with respect to the 
subject matter which indicates an assumption of jurisdiction and dominion 
over the same. Arnold v. City of Orange, 73 N. ]. Eq. 28o; Hall v. Brey-
fogle, 162 Ind. ~94 (500); Chapman v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, r46 Mich. 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 451 
23; Folsom v. Town of Underhill, 36 Vt. 58o. But, that these repairs must 
have been made by the city officials who have authority to accept and lay 
out streets, see Ogle v. City of Cumberland, 90 Md. 59; People v. Underhill, 
J 44 N. Y. 316; State of M ailfe v. Bradbury, 40 Me. 154; Reed v. !tlhabitants 
of Scituate, 5 Allen 120. It is on the principle enunciated in these last cases 
that the instant case seems to have been decided, since in that case it does not 
appear that the improvements were made by the direction or authority of 
the highway commissioners. 
HOSPITAI.S-LIADII.I'l'Y FOR SERVANT'S TORTS-LIABII.ITY FOR V1or.ATION OF 
CoNTRACTUAI. DuTY.-Defendant was owner of a private hospital .and con-
tracted with the plaintiff to furnish her with a room, nurses' care, and the 
use of the operating room for an operation for which >ether was to be ad-
ministered. While under the influence of the amesthetic the plaintiff was 
robbed of a valuable ring and the evidence tended to show that it was stolen 
by one of the nurses. No negligence on defendant's part was shown. Held, 
that though defendant was not negligent, and though the nurse, in stealing 
the ring, was not acting within the course of her employment, yet defendant 
was liable for the breach of his contractual duty to afford her protection, 
whether from employees or strangers. Vannah v. Hart Private Hospital, 
(Mass., 1917), II7 N. E. 328. 
A master is liable for the neligent or even malicious torts of his serv-
ants so long as they are within the course of his employment as furthering, 
however remotely, the master's business, Holler v. Ross, 68 N. J. L. 324; 
and in some instances a master is liable for his servants' acts without the 
course of his employment, if they result in injury to those to whom the mas-
ter owes a special duty of hospitality or protection. The,most striking ex-
ample of this is of course the liability of the common carrier. A steamboat 
company is liable for an assault on a passenger by a waiter employed in the 
lunchroom, Bryant v. Rich, io6 Mass. 18o, and a railroad company for a 
brakeman's abuse of a passenger according to Goddard v. Grand Trunk, 
57 Me. 202; and so is a sleeping car company for an attack by a porter on 
the occupier of a berth, Nevin v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 1o6 Ill. 222. Al-
though at first there was some conflict of authorities, the weight of recent 
decisions seems to be in favor of accepting the doctrine announced in the 
Goclclarcl Case, S11pra, that the liability of a carrier is almost that of an in-
surer. But this exceptional liability has been ascribed to others who invite 
guests upon their premises, thereby impliedly warranting to them courteous 
treatment and personal safety. The same principle applies to innkeepers and 
theatre-proprietors ih England almost without question, cf. 16 MICH. L. Rsv. 
202; in the United States with less unanimity, but yet in a goodly array of 
authorities; Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72; Rommel v. Schambacher, 
120 Pa. 579; D~kson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507; and finally in the vexed case 
of Clancy v. Barker, (Neb.), 98 N. W. 440; though the same facts resulted 
in a contrary verdict, by a divided court, in 131 Fed. 161, on the theory that 
this extra liability applies only to carriers because of the extra hazard inci-
dental to the service they offer. If the implied warranty contained in an 
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offer of and contract for service includes within itself a guarantee of pro-
tection and immunity from injury while enjoying said services, when the 
service is to be performed by a carrier, innkeeper, or theatrical manager, 
certainly the extension of that doctrine to include hospitals, the very essence 
of whose service is protection to the weak, is a logical development of the 
same idea. 
INDICTMEN'l' AND INFORMATION-AMENDMENT-ALLEGATION AS TO TiME.-
'Where an indictment charged the commission of an offense at an impossible 
date, to-wit, a date subsequent to that on which the indictment was found, 
held, that the indictment is defective in substance and can not be amended 
by the court. People v. Van Every (N. Y., 1917), II8 N. E. 244. 
Substantial parts· of an indictment are always drawn and presented by 
a grand jury and, if defective, must be amended by the grand jury because 
the indictment in its substantial parts must be solely the work of a grand 
jury. Ex parte Baia, 121 U. S. T; Hawthorn v. State of Maryland, 56 Md. 
· 530; Patrick v. People of State of Illinois, 132 Ill. 529; State v. Squire, IO 
N. H. 558. Formal parts of an indictment, such as a formal conclusion, like 
"against the peace and dignity of the state", are inserted by a court without 
the concurrence of a grand jury because these parts were not originally the 
work of a grand jury. Cafa v. The State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 512; Hite v. The 
State, 9 Yerg. ('l'enn.) lg8. An allegation of the date at which the offense 
was committed is, as the instant case holds, emphatically a substantial part 
of the indictment. Sanders v. The State, 26 Tex. 120; Dickson v. State of 
Florida, 20 Fla. 800; State v. Sexton, 3 Hawks (N. Car.) 184. Because in-
formations, unlike indictments, are not the work of a grand jury they may 
be amended, with the court's consent, by the public officer, or officer of the 
crown, by whom they are presented. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527; Daxan-
beklar v. Tlze People, 93 Ill. A. 553; Long v. People of State of Illinois, 135 
Ill. 435. 
INSURANCE -ACCIDENT INSURANCE- DEATH BY SUBMARINE- EXTERNAL, 
VIOLENT AND ACCIDENTAL MEANS.-An accident policy excepted from liabil-
ity loss under any circumstances from firearms or explosives. The holder 
of such a policy was a passenger on the steamer Arabic which was sunk off 
the coast of Ireland. Held, the torpedoing of the vessel was not the direct 
cause of the death of insured where the facts tended to show that death 
arose from drawning. Woods v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit, (Wis., 
1918), 166 N. W. ~o. 
The insuring clause of the policy provided that it insured the holder 
against bodily injuries effected solely by external, violent and accidental 
means, with the further provision that no benefits would be paid for injuries 
from firearms or explosives. There is no doubt but that if drowning was 
the proximate cause of the death that it is within the terms of the policy. 
De Van v. Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 157 N. Y. 
690. The question involved in this case is clearly that of proximate cause. 
Had the deceased been standing on some part of the ship where he would 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS . 453 
have been blown into the sea and immediately drowned, his death would 
clearly be within the terms of the policy. The fact that he fastened a life 
preserver upon himself and got into a boat did not take away the danger 
of losing his life but only lessened it. Just when the intervention of a vol-
untary act under the stress of circumstances, as appear in this case will 
break the chain of causation is a mixed question of law and fact. If it is 
such that it becomes the active, efficient, producing cause of which the death 
is a natural and probable consequence in view of the existing circumstances 
and conditions, the law will stop there and not go back farther in· the line 
of causation. It is not easy, however, to reconcile all the cases on this sub-
ject. Recovery can be had on an accident policy where the injury caused 
rheumatism which resulted in death. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Hm1ter, 30 Tex. 
Civ. App. 489. The sting of an insect is the proximate cause of death re-
·sulting from blood poisoning caused by the sting. Omberg v. U. S. Mut. 
Acc. Ass'-11., IOI Ky. 303. Where one holding an accident policy falls from a 
window in delirium, the delirium is the proximate cause of the injury. Carr 
v. Pac. J,fot. Life l11s. Co., IOO Mo. App. 002. Under a policy insuring against 
accidental injuries the insurer is liable for the death of the insured result-
ing from an operation rendered necessary by an accidental rupture Collins 
v. Casualty Co. of America, 224 Mass. 327. Cases like the instant one are 
no doubt justifiable on the ground that the insurer prepares his own con-
-tract and therefore it should be construed most strongly against him. 
!NSURANCE-ACCIDSNT PoucY-SUNSTROKr:- "Accm£NTAL M£ANS."-An 
insurance policy indemnified "against bodily injury (herein called such in-
jury) sustained solely through accidental means," and provided that a sun-
stroke "shall be deemed to be included in said term 'such -fujury"'. Assured 
while engaged in the performance of his duties as traffic policeman suffered 
a sunstroke. Held, assured is entitled to recover on the policy. Higgins v. 
Midland Carualty Co., (Ill., I917), n8 N. E. II. · · 
The present case raises the question whether a sunstroke suffered by a 
person while engaged in his usual occupation under normal circumstances 
constitutes a "bodily injury" through "accidental means." It is well settled 
that an injury which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or 
course of action voluntarily undertaken by the assured is not an injury by 
"accidental means." Hutton v. States Accident Insiir. Co., 267 Ill. 267; 
Taliaferro v. Travellers' Protect. Assoc. of America, 8o Fed. 368; Fidelity 
& Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Stacey's E~rs., 143 Fed. 27I. The question of 
the instant case has so far been adjudicated by only a few cases. Along 
with the instant case, the case of Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., Io7 
Tex. 582; Pack v. Prudential Ca.malty Co., 170 Ky. 47, and Gallagher v. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 148 N. Y. S. IOI6, have determined that a 
sunstroke under the circumstances of the instant case is an injury through 
"accidental means." A diligent search has revealed only two cases which 
decide the contrary. Semancik v. Co11titimtal Casualty Co., 56 Pa. Sup. 392, 
and Elses v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., (Ind. App. I9I5), 109 N. E. 
413. Neither case was decided in a court of final jurisdiction and the de-
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cision in each case was based largely on the same three cases, to-wit, Bryant 
v.Continental Casualty Co., s11pra; Dozier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of 
N. Y., 46 Fed. 446; Sinclair v. The Maritime Passengers' Assiirance Co., 
3 El. & El. 478. The first of these cases, decided in 1912 in the Civil Court 
of Appeals of Texas, 145 S. W. 636, has since been reversed in the Texas 
Supreme Court, 107 Tex. 582. The policies on which suit was brought in 
the Dozier and Sinclair Cases, siipra, provided against bodily or personal 
injuries through "accidental means," and did not provide for sunstroke. 
Therefore, the decision in those cases that no recovery could be had where 
the injury or death resulted from sunstroke is proper and unavoidable, since 
admittedly a sunstroke is not a bodily or personal injury in the ordinary 
sense. Probably as a result of these cases a provision, like that of the instant 
case, that sunstroke through "accidental means" shall be deemed a bodily 
injury was inserted in insurance policies. The cases of Semancik v. Cantin. 
Cas. Co. and Elsey v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N. Y., ante, seem to be unsupported 
by authority. The instant case holds that a sunstroke under the circum-
stances of this case is an unusual, unexpected event, so that it can not be 
deemed a natural and probable consequence of assured's self-exposure to 
the sun. 
INSURANCE-HE.<\LTH AND ACCIDENT-LIABIUTY.-Plaintiff sued on a 
health insurance policy which was conditioned on the disability of the as-
sured "from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occu-
pation," during which disability the assured shall be "necessarily confined to 
the house." During all but two days of the period for which sickness in-
demnity was claimed, plaintiff, after visiting his doctor, at whose office it 
was necessary to call on account of the nature of the treatment, walked to 
his law office, where he usually remained only fifteen or twenty minutes, and 
transacted a little of his business. Held, the visits to the law office consti-
tuted a breach of condition of necessary confmement. Pirscher v. Casualty 
Co. of America, (Md. I9I7), I02 At!. 546. 
All courts construe an insurance policy against the insurer when the terms 
are at all uncertain or ambiguous. Rocci v. Mass. Accident Co., 222 Mass. 
336; Turner v. Fide lit)• & Casualty Co. of N. Y., n2 Mich. 425. The terms 
in the policy in the instant case providing for necessary confinement and total 
disability as conditions for recovery are uncertain and therefore open to in-
terpretation. Instances of literal interpretation of the condition of necessary 
confinement are: Cooper v. Phoeni:r: Accident & Sick Benefit Association, 
141 Mich. 478, holding that the assured was not "necessarily confined" when 
he had visited his doctor and on the doctor's advice had taken walks for his 
health; Schneps v. Fidelity & Castialty Co. of N. Y., IOI, N. Y. S. Io6, hold-
ing that the presence of the assured in New . York City and in the moun-
tains for cure was a breach of the condition of necessary confinement; 
Bradshaw v. American Benevolent Association, n2 Mo. App. 435, holding 
that one was not necessarily confined who on one occasion went to a 
doctor outside of the city and on another occasion took a ten days' trip for 
his health; Rocci v. Mass. Accident Co., 222 Mass. 336, holding that a change 
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from one hospital or house to another at intervals of two or three weeks was 
not necessary confinement. There is a relaxation from this literal and strict 
position in Mietual Benefit Association v. Nancarrow, 18 Col. App. 274; 
Dulany v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 106 Md. 17; Scales v. Masonic 
Protective Association, 70 N. H. 490, where the taking of outdoor exercise, 
on a doctor's advice, was deemed consistent with a "necessary confinement'' 
condition. A very liberal interpretation is seen in Hoffman v. Michigan 
Home & Hospital Association, 128 Mich. 323 (2 of the 5 judges dissenting), 
viz., that visits to a doctor, walks on his advice, visits away for a change of 
scenery, do not constitute a breach of this condition. The total disability 
clause in health policies, such as that in the instant case, which the court did 
not pass upon, also receives interpretations both literal and liberal. Literal 
interpretations are seen in Saveland v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 
67 Wis. 174; Lyon v. Railway Passenger Assur. Co., 46 Ia. 631. However, 
by weight of authority, a liberal interpretation is adopted, viz., that a total 
disability clause is satisfied if the assured is unable, in a substantial and 
material sense, to do his usual business in substantially the usual way. 
Young v. Trwellers' Ins. Co., 8o Me. 244;Turner v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 
of N. Y., II2 Mich. 425; Neafie v. Manufacturers' Accid. Indemnity Co., 
8 N. Y. S. 202; Lobdill v. Laboringmen's Mut. Aid Assoc. of Chatfield, 6g 
Minn. 14; Mut. Benefit Assoc. v. Nancarrow, 18 Col. App. 274 The courts 
in the minority in holding to a literal interpretation of this clause suggest 
that the assured should refuse the total disability policy and demand a par-
tial disability policy. Under this literal interpretation the circumstances of 
the instant case would not constitute total disability inasmuch as the plaintiff 
was able to go to his office each day for a short time. Almost certainly this 
would not be the view of courts adopting the liberal inteipretation. 
LANDI.ORD AND TuNAN't-EVIC'.l'lON-IN~NC£ WI'tH Sun-r.~ss£.-The 
plaintiff, the lessee of the defendant occupied part of the premises leased and 
sub-let the remainder. Defendant wrote to the sub-tenants forbidding them 
to pay rent to the plaintiff, representing that the latter had no right to the 
premises, and collected the rents. Plafutiff moved out and sued for eviction. 
Held, that there was no eviction, since there was no ouster or interference 
with the plaintiff's beneficial use of the premises. Aguglia v. Cavicchia, 
(Mass., 1918), n8 N. E. 283. 
The case presents the situation of an alleged eviction from part of the 
premises leased-that part being a reversion-:-end a subsequent abandonment 
of the portion occupied by the lessee himself. In a technical sense there can 
be no physical interference with incorporeal property. Recognizing this 
difficulty, the courts have utilized the doctrine of constructive eviction in the 
case of disturbances of the enjoyment of easements and reversions, and have 
applied the rule that, "any obstruction by the landlord to the beneficial en-
joyment of the demis!!d premises, or diminution of the consideration of the 
contract by the acts of the landlord, amounts to a constructive eviction." 
Le'@is v. Payn, 4 Wend, 423. In Lewis v. Payn, a constructive eviction was 
found when the original landlord distrained on the premises of the sub-
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lessees for rent due to the lessee; the court added that this amounted to 
"something more than a constructive eviction". This elaboration was prob-
ably added because an actual eviction from a reversion is· impossible. In 
that case the eviction was from the entire reversion-the lessee was in pos-
session of no part of the demised premises. In Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 
727, the lessee sub-let part and remained in possession of part. When the 
landlord committed acts amounting to .a constructive eviction the sub-tenant 
and the lessee both -moved out. It was held that the lessee was evicted from 
the whole of the premises including the reversion. But in that case there 
was actual disturbance of the lessee's quiet enjoyment of the part he himself 
occupied. The eviction from the reversion can be said to have been included 
when the lessee was evicted from his part, since an eviction from part is an 
eviction from the whole. The theory is that the wrong-doer will not be 
allowed to apportion his wrong. Ibid, 731; Leishman v. White, I Allen 48g; 
Lawrence v. French, 25 Wend. 443. Assuming for the present that the land-
lord's acts in the principal case were of the quality to effect a constructive 
eviction from the reversion, the question arises whether this would take in 
the part actually occupied by the lessee and abandoned by him. It is sub-
mitted that this conclusion ought to follow, since, as indicated above,· an 
eviction from part is an eviction from the whole. The fact that we are try-
ing to pass from an eviction from incorporeal property to an eviction from 
corporeal property ought to raise no difficulties, since, as regards the land-
lord who is a wrong-doer, the nature of the tenant's right interfered with 
should be immaterial-for the reversion is equally a part of the premises 
demised. The writer has been unable to find any cases exactly analogous 
on this point. There is a dictum in Burn v. Phelps, I Starkie 94. where the 
lessee sub-let to several sub-lessees one of whom was evicted by the original 
landlord; Lord Ellenborough there said that the lessee might have pleaded 
an eviction from the whole of the premises which would have included the 
i>ortion occupied by the other sub-lessees. An analogy might be drawn from 
fhose cases where an eviction from an easement is held to justify an aban-
.clonment of the remainder of the premises. The West Side Savings Bank 
v. Newton, 57 How. Pr. (N: Y.) 152. It is doubtful whether the court in the 
principal case came to the correct conclusion when it denied that the acts 
of the landlord amounted to a constructive eviction. The rent due to the 
lessee is part of the substance of the lessee's beneficial enjoyment. He should 
not be forced to sue his sub-tenants for rent which they would have willing-
ly paid had it not been for the landlord's intermeddling .. An eviction has 
been found in the following cases under facts quite similar. Biirn v. Phelps, 
s11pra; Lewis v. Payn, supra; Leadbeater v. Roth, 25 Ill. 478; Burhans v. 
Monier, 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 466. The court in the principal case indi.cates 
that the sub-tenants were estopped to deny their landlord's title. This is a 
misapplication of the doctrine of estoppel, which can operate only between 
the parties to a suit; it cannot bind strangers to it. South v. Deaton, II3 Ky. 
31;. At most there was only a potential estoppel. Since Dyett v. Pendll!MJn, 
supra, the right of ·the tenant to defend by showing a constructive eviction 
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when sued for rent due him has been put on the grounds of failure of consid-
eration due to the acts of the landlord. But this defense to the performance 
of a contract can not operate when the tenant himself sues. This right has 
been given by some courts on the theory of an implied agreement of the 
landlord not to interfere with the performance by the tenant. McDowell v. 
H'sman, 117 Cal. 67; 29 HARV. L. REv. 555; contra, Malzy v. Eichholz, [1916], 
L. R., 2 K. B. Div. 3o8. The acceptance of this view would remove the last 
obstacle to the tenant's right to recover in this case. 
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-}UDICIAI. PROCEEDINGS TO TisT SANITY.-Under 
a statute authorizing a proceeding before a justice of the peace to determine 
whether a resident alleged to be insane was a proper subject for treatment 
and entitled to be maintained at the state hospital the defendant maliciously 
commenced action against the plaintiff. In defence to an action for malicious 
prosecution the defendant claimed the action to have been extra-judicial. 
Held, that the proceeding was judicial and adequate to support the action. 
Treloar v. Harris, (Ind., I917), n7 N. E. 975. 
The initial requirement that in order to show a good cause of action for 
malicious prosecution a criminal proceeding must have been instituted by 
the defendant has been so far cut down that some courts, as the above, will 
allow recovery where any judicial proceeding has been commenced. There 
is, however, considerable variance on this matter. It is well settled in Eng-
land and America that the action will lie where criminal proceedings have 
been set on foot. Elsee v. Smith, 2 Chit., 304; Dennis v. Ryan, 65 N. Y. 385; 
Sweet v. Negus, 30 Mich. 4o6; also, where the suit is a civil one and in-
volves arrest of person or attachment of property, Harr. v. Ward, 73 Ark. 
437; Tomli11son a11d Sperry v. Warner, 9 Ohio 104; Smith v. Cattel, 2 Wits. 
K. B. 376; or where the action results in special damage to business or rep-
utation, viz.: proceedings to wind up a trading company, Quartz Hill Con-
solidated Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre, II Q. B. Div. 674-proceedings to de-
-clare one a bankrupt, Chapman v. Pickersgill, C. P. 2 Wits. I45; Wilkinson v. 
Goodfellow-Brooks Shoe Co. et. al, I4I Fed. 218--inquisition of lunacy, 
Dordoni v. Smith, 82 N. J. L. 525. Many courts in this 'country allow the 
action for the institution of any civil judicial proceeding, Closson v. Staples, 
.42 Vt. 209; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 46I. The leaning seems to be in this 
direction, N:ewr:Lr. ON MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 32; I Coor.r:Y ON TORTS, (3rd 
Ed.) 350. Indiana adheres to the latter view, Coffey v. Myers, 84 Ind. I05; 
McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538. Even though the principal case involves 
a non-criminal proceeding without arrest or attachment of property it would 
be in accordance with the doctrine of the Indiana courts since there is the 
added feature of special damage to reputation, Locke11our v. Sides, 57 Ind . 
.JOO. However, the case has one peculiarity in that the judicial proceeding 
does not purport to adjudicate or conclude the mental status of the person 
alleged to be insane, but merely declares that the person as fit to be ad-
mitted to one of the hospitals, which is the only purpose for which the statute 
was enacted, Naanes v. State, I43 Ind. 299. The same case arose in California 
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under a very similar statute where the recovery was allowed even after the 
plaintiff had been a resident at the asylum, Kellog v. Cochran, 87 Cal. 192. 
These cases involving a statutory proceeding, though very rare, raise an in-
teresting inquiry-from an entirely different angle-into the requisite nature 
of the judicial proceeding. While the opinions have said nothing about the 
ultimate nature of the judicial proceedings as regards the contested rights 
of the party maliciously sued, yet it is evident from an examination of the 
cases that the purpose of the suit in every instance was to impair some val-
uable right enjoyed by the defendant; rights fa rem were always involved. 
In the principal case, no right which the plaintiff desired to preserve was at 
stake in the malicious suit: the right to reside in the asylum was, no doubt, 
far from his desire; nor does the statute authorize a finding by the justice 
of the peace to force his residence there. It is clear that the plaintiff could 
not prevail if the proceedings instituted were extra-judicial, Turpin v. Remy, 
3 -Blackf. 210. To keep the case within the rule, therefore, the court lays 
down a broad definition of judicial proceeding: a proceeding by a regularly 
constituted court of justice clothed with authority to hear and determine a 
question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, upon evidence written 
or oral, to be produced before such court, and thereupon to enter a decision 
affecting the material rights or interests of one or more persons or bodies 
. corporate. The court goes on the ground that the gravamen of the action 
for malicious prosecution is the fact that the plaintiff "has been improperly 
made the subject of legal process to his damage." It would seem that the 
holding of the court works best to prevent the use of the judicial machinery 
for malicious purposes, which is, after all, the real reason for allowing the 
action. 
NEGI,IGENCS- LI~NSEE OR !NVI'l'EE- PERSON ACCOMPANYING PURCHASER 
IN'l'O SroRE.-Two boys entered a grocery store, only one of whom intended 
to purchase. As a clerk opened a case of goods the other, (the plaintiff), 
was blinded in one eye by a flying piece of metal. He brought an action and 
was nonsuited in the trial court. Held, nonsuit proper; the plaintiff was a 
mere licensee, not an invitee, and only entitled to protection against willful 
injury. Fleckenstein v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co:, (N. J., 1917), 102 
Atl. 700. 
The fundamental difference between a licensee and invitee is the purpose 
with which one is on the other's premises. In the words of KNowr.'l'ON, J., 
"* * * to come under an implied invitation as distinguished from a mere 
licensee, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business in 
which the occupant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there. 
There must at least be some mutuality of interest in the subject to which the 
visitor's business relates, although the particular thing which is the object 
of the visit may not be for the benefit of the occupant." Plummer v. Dill, 
156 Mass. ¢. In that case the plaintiff went on defendant's premises in 
search of a servant and was heldto be only a licensee. See also Indermaur 
v. Dames, 14 L. T. R. (N. S.) 484. A woman, who because she was of the 
same race and religion as a dead man, came to the house he had occupied 
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to attend his wake, she was held but a license. Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475. 
But where a boy accompanied his father to inspect a house that the latter 
contemplated renting, he was an invitee, since it was for the landowner's 
interest that members of the plaintiff's family inspect the house to aid the 
prospective tenant in his decision as to renting it, Kalus v. Bass, 122 Md. 467. 
And a woman ~as an invitee who accompanied her husband to a lumber 
yard to aid in the purchase for her of an ironing board. Davis v. Ferris, 
53 N. Y. Supp. 571. In the principal case the plaintiff was no more than a 
licensee, a volunteer, although his companion was an invitee. This separa-
tion into different characters of two persons who come together, stay to-
gether, and go together, is analogous to the considering of one man as an 
invitee as to part of the occupant's premises and a licensee as to the rest. 
In Herzog v. Hemphill, 7 Cal. App. u6, the plaintiff entered defendant's 
tamale stand to buy tamales. Here he was an invitee. But when he went 
into the cellar for purposes of nature he was a licensee as to that portion 
of the premises and had only the rights of such. 
Pru:NCIPAI, AND AGENT-TRA.VEI.ING SAI.ESMAN-AUTHORITY TO T~ OR-
DERS.-The traveling salesman of a vendor took an order from the trustee 
of a saloon attached by creditors, agreeing that his principal should come in 
pro rata with the other creditors and that the vendee was to be bound only 
as trustee and not personally. The principal shipped without knowledge of 
the restricted liability stipulated for. Held, three justices dissenting, it was 
within the scope of the agent's authority to take an order with such an agree-
ment, and the principal was bound by it. Rothchild Bros. v. Kennedy, (Ore., 
1917), 16g Pac. 102. 
The general rule of law as to the extent of a drummer's authority can 
be simply stated. In common with other selling agents, he has power within 
the limits openly fixed by the principal or determined by usage and custom, 
to agree upon the terms of the sale and do what is incidentally necessary to 
effectuate it. Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56; Blaess v. Nichols, 
IIS Ia .. 373; Leach v. Beardslee, 22 Conn. 404; SToRY OF AGENCY, (Ed 8), 
sec. 1o6; TIFFANY ON AGENCY, sec. 48 et seq. The terms he makes must be 
usual and reasonable, not extraordinary. Beck v. Freund, II7 N. Y. Supp. 
193; Putnam & Co. v. French, 53 Vt. 402; MECHEM ON AGENCY (Ed. 4), 
sec. 362. But the application of the rule to particular cases in which the 
agent has made an agreement with the vendee often brings the question of 
custom and reasonableness squarely before the court This has led to the 
laying down of several doctrines. An agent may not sell at a price so far 
below the market price as to put the vendee on inquiry as to his authority. 
Mabray v. Kelly-Goodfellow Shoe Co., 73 Mo. App. I; Brown Grocery Co. 
v. Becket, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 393. He cannot bind the principal by secret re-
bate agreements. Tollerton & Warfield Co. v. Gilri1th, 21 S. Dak 320; 
Taylor Mfg. Co. v. Brown, 4 Tex. Ct. of App., Civ. C. 19. He cannot take 
satisfaction of his personal obligation to the vendee as payment. Shoninger 
v. Peabody, 59 Conn. 588. He cannot make warranties not recognized by 
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usage or authorized by his principal. Holcomb v. Cable Co., u9 Ga. 466. 
·Though he may do so within the customary limits of his line of business. 
Blaess v. Nichols, supra. The principal case comes close to infringing on 
many of the doctrines here laid down, and is at swords' points with other 
decisions in the salesman field. Traveling men almost universally sell on 
commission and it is to their interest to enhance their sales as much as pos-
sible. In Lindow v. Cohn, 5 Cal. App. 388, a drummer agreed to take as 
part payment, 'previously sold good!\- which had not come up to warranty. 
His principal shipped the goods, in ignorance of the agreement, and was 
allowed to recover the whole purchase price. In Friedman & Sons v. Kelly, 
l~ Mo. App. 279, the traveler agreed that his firm would take back all goods 
unsold at the end of the season. His principal was not bound by the agree-
ment. In Ide v. Brody, 156 Ill. App. 479, the drummer was willing, in order 
to make a sale, that his firm allow a return of any goods not satisfactory 
which should in the future be sold to this vendee. The principal was allowed 
to repudiate the agreement. The majority opinion in the principal case goes 
on the grounds that the subsequent shipment by the principal is an accept-
ance of all the terms as made by the agent, since it was the latter's duty to 
notify his principal of those terms and such knowledge will be imputed. This 
seems to beg the entire question of the agent's authority, since knowledge of· 
an agent's acts can be imputed to the principal only when the agent is act-
ing within the scope of his authority, and not when he knows that he is 
overstepping the bounds of his powers. See Clement v. Young-M cShea 
Amusement Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 677. The doctrine of the principal case appears 
to go further than is necessary for the protection of purchasers from drum-
mers, and to put in the hands of traveling salesmen more power than is 
desirable. 
WAR-MILI'.l'ARY AuTBORI'.rn:s-]URISDICTION To TRY OntNsr:.-A soldier, 
after declaration that a state of war existed between the United States and 
Germany, killed a policeman of a Kentucky city. He was turned over to the 
civil authorities. His captain and major consented on the same day that the 
civil authorities should proceed with the case. A writ of habeas corpus was 
sued out for his surrender to the military authorities, the commanding office~ 
of the brigade asserting prior jurisdiction in the courts-martial. Held, that 
the military authorities had superior jurisdiction of the offense and that the 
hasty consent of the soldier's captain and major was not a waiver of juris-
diction as against the commanding officer of his brigade. Ex parte King,. 
(1917), -246 Fed. 868. 
This case is the first decision handed down on the prior jurisdiction of 
the military courts over a soldier committing a homicide during time of war, 
although there are some dicta to the same effect in the cases bearing on the 
qttestion. The present decision comes under the War Act, Aug. 29, 1916, 
U. S. Compiled Stat. 1916, Sec. 23o8-a which takes place of Section 1342 
U. S. Rev. Stat. Previously, under Sec .. 1342 a soldier of the United States 
could be court-martialed in time of peace for offenses committed by him in 
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violation of the criminal laws of a state or of the United States. He could 
be tried by a general court-martial for a capital crime as a disorder or neg-
lect prejudicial to good order and military discipline, even though he had 
been acquitted for murder by the civil authorities. bi re Stubbs, 133 
Fed. 1012. And a trial and acquital by a court-martial is not a bar to a pros-
ecution by the proper civil authorities. U. S. v. Clark, 31 Fed. 710, In re 
Fair, lOO Fed. 149· It will be noted this is not unconstitutional as the pris-
oner is prosecuted in each case for a different offense. But an acquital by 
a court-martial is a bar to subsequent prosecution in a civil court for the 
same acts constituting the same crime. The jurisdiction of the military 
courts is thus seen to be concurrent with the civil courts. Graf ton v. U. S., 
206 U. S. 333, II Ann. Cas. 640; Franklin v. U. S., 216 U. S. 559. In Cole-
man v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, it was said that where an offense covered by 
this article was committed in time of war in enemy country, the military 
authorities have exclusive jurisdiction of the offense. "This position was 
based on principles of international law and not on an interpretation of the 
statute." Ex Parte King (supra). It was in that case Field, J., recognized 
the superior jurisdiction of the military authorities in a case like the pres-
ent. Whatever may have been the law under the old articles, under the new 
ones the military authorities have the preference in the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. The court intimates that the jurisdiction may even be exclusive. Most 
of the cases cited above were discussed by the court. 
Wm.s-EsTATr: Dr:visim-Ru:r.r: IN S:a:r::r.r.n's CAsr:.-A will devised tes-
tators' land to their son-ih-law and daughter, adding that after the daugh-
ter's death it was to be divided equally between said ~on-in-law and the 
heirs of the daughter's body. The daughter, who subsequently outlived her 
husband, bad joined with him in a conveyance to the defendant. She is 
now dead and the plaintiff is her only heir-at-law. Held, that the rule in 
Shelley's Case applies in spite of previous North Carolina decisions reject-
ing its application where the limitation to the heirs is qualified by the words 
"equally to be divided," and the like, because here the qualifying words serve 
merely to separate the hu.sband's estate from that of the heirs of the wife; 
that the statute enJarges a fee-tail into a fee simple and the defendant takes 
an indefeasible title under the conveyance. (Clark, C. J. and Brown, J. dis-
senting). White v. Goodin, (N. C., 1917), 94 S. E. 454 
It is noteworthy that the whole court unites in the belief that such words 
of division may remove the devise from the application of the rule, though 
they acknowledge that this position is exactly contrary to the holdings of the 
English courts, see lesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh 1, wherein the device was 
worded in exactly the same language as here. Apparently they do not 
realize that it is also contrary to an acknowledgment of the validity of the 
rule, which we are told is not one of construction but of legal policy, Per-
rin v. Blake, 4 Burr. 2579. American courts however have not always felt 
constrained to follow the English decisions, particul.arly where a devise is in 
question, but have rather hesitated to defeat the testator's intent though he 
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attempted to effectuate it in defiance of established legal principles, Ridgeway 
v. Lamphear, 99 Ind. 251. Still other jurisdictions show an inclination to take 
advantage of the words of distribution to construe "heirs" as a word of 
purchase. Fulton v. Harman, 44 Md. 251. 
WoRK.MJ?N's CoMPJ?NSATION-CoURSS oF E:r.i:noYMSN't-"AlusmG Ou-.r oF 
EMPLOYMJ?N'I''.-An employee of a master engaged in the business of repair-
ing furnaces, while on his way to do a job of repairing, left the vehicle pro-
vided by his employer, to buy tobacco for personal use. In crossing the 
street to reach the tobacco store he was struck by an automobile and killed. 
In a proceeding by the widow and children to obtain an award of compensa-
tion under the Workmen's Compensation Act, held, two judges dissenting, 
there should be no award, the accident not having been one arising "in the 
course and out of the employment". In re Betts, {Ind. App., 1918), n8 
RR~ " 
Emphasis was laid chiefly upon the fact that as the deceased was exposed 
only to the same hazards on the street as any pedestrian, his employment 
could not be said to have any causal connection with the injury, hence the 
accident was not one arising "out of his employment". Among the cases 
chiefly relied upon for this conclusion are the English cases repudiated by 
the House of Lords in Dennis v. /.A. White & Co., [1917], A. C. 479, com- , 
mented upon in 16 MICH. L. Rr:v. 179· See Martin v. Lovibond & Sons, 
[1914), 2 K. B. 22'], where compensation was awarded for an injury received 
by a drayman in the street while returning to his team after getting a glass 
of beer. 
